

Chapter 12

Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination

John F. Dovidio and James M. Jones

The assassination in 1968 of Martin Luther King Jr., who was one of the most important and influential leaders of the civil rights movement in the United States, profoundly affected people of all ages across the country. King spoke eloquently about the evils of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, and he strongly advocated for racial equality and integration. Shortly after King's death, Jane Elliot, a third-grade teacher, wanted to teach her students in Riceville, Iowa—a virtually all-White community—a lesson about discrimination. In a classic demonstration, captured on film as *The Eye of the Storm*, she divided her class into two groups: those with blue eyes and those with brown eyes. Mrs. Elliot told the class that the blue-eyed children were superior, gave them the best seats in the room and often cited examples of famous people who had blue eyes ("George Washington had blue eyes"). By contrast, she described brown-eyed children as inferior, and when one child with brown eyes forgot his lunch, Mrs. Elliott rebuked him and attributed his forgetfulness to his brown-eyed status. Soon the blue-eyed children became suspicious of the brown-eyed children. They wanted the cafeteria workers to limit how much food the brown-eyed students could have and asked Jane Elliot to keep a yardstick close by in case the brown-eyed kids "got out of hand." They teased the brown-eyed children until a fight broke out at recess.

The next day, Jane Elliot resumed the exercise but explained that she made a mistake: It was the brown-eyed children that were superior! The second day was a mirror image of the first, with the brown-eyed children acting superior to the blue-eyed children. On the second day, the brown-eyed children's school performance improved, while the blue-eyed children did worse. Even the meaning of being "blue-eyed" changed in students' minds. At recess, a brown-eyed child taunted another student in the class with the chant, "blue-eyes, blue-eyes" until a fight broke out. Over the next two decades, Jane Elliot repeated this exercise for a range of audiences. She demonstrated time and time again how easy it is to get people—adults as well as children—to discriminate on the basis of a superficial distinction.

In this chapter we explain, from a social psychological perspective, that the behavior of children in Jane Elliot's class, as well as biases in the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior toward members of different groups more generally, are grounded in fundamental and in some ways adaptive psychological processes.

People are, by nature, social animals. Evolutionarily, being part of a group not only offered greater physical protection but also enabled us, through systems of trust and reciprocity, to achieve and prosper through

coordinated action substantially more than we could alone. Identifying other individuals as members of one's group (the ingroup) was thus of primary importance, but knowing who is a member of a different, potentially competitive group was also valuable. Because of the central importance of distinguishing whether another person is an ingroup or outgroup member, we automatically think differently about someone we see as an ingroup as opposed to an outgroup member. Moreover, as social neuroscience has revealed, our thoughts about these individuals originate in different areas of the brain: Information about ingroup members often activates the brain in ways similar to the activation that occurs when we think about ourselves. However, despite the enormous benefits of these ways of thinking and the architecture in our brains that support it, distinguishing between ingroup and outgroup members lays the foundation for the occurrence and pervasive influence of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination in social life today.

In this chapter, we first define and distinguish prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination. We then consider the bases of these forms of bias, both in terms of the dimensions on which we differ (e.g., personality) and those inclinations that we have in common (e.g., social categorization). After that, we review the empirical relationship of prejudice and stereotyping with discrimination. We specifically examine how the complex and often subtle ways people express their bias and how institutional and cultural influences operate to produce disparate outcomes. These multilevel effects go beyond the direct effects of personal prejudice or stereotypes. The effects of these forces on the targets of discrimination are also briefly considered. In our last substantive section, we consider the most established and promising interventions for reducing prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

Definitions and Measurement of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination

Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are the three major elements of intergroup bias. However, they differ in important ways.

Prejudice

Broadly considered, prejudice is an attitude that represents generalized feelings toward and evaluation of a group or its members and can result in discriminatory behavior or behavioral intentions. However, conceptualizations of prejudice have evolved over time. In his seminal volume, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954) defined *prejudice* as "an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he [sic] is a member of that group" (p. 9). The current, more expansive view defines prejudice as "an individual-level attitude (subjectively positive or negative) toward groups and their members that creates or maintains hierarchical status relations between groups" (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010, p. 7).

Consistent with this definition, prejudice can involve both positive and negative responses that can vary in response to group members' observed conformity or nonconformity to social roles (Eagly & Diekmann, 2005). People who deviate from their group's traditional role typically arouse negative reactions, whereas those who exhibit behaviors that reinforce the status quo elicit positive responses. Related research on ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001) suggests that prejudice toward women can have a "hostile" component, which punishes women who deviate from a traditional subordinate role, as well as a "benevolent" component that celebrates women's supportive, but subordinate, position. Thus, prejudice need not always reflect negative attitudes toward a target group but can also consist of seemingly positive attitudes toward

an outgroup that may nevertheless relate to discriminatory behavior (e.g., patronizing responses toward women).

Stereotypes

By most historical accounts, the term *stereotype* was coined in 1922 to refer to the typical picture that comes to mind when thinking about a particular social group (Lippmann, 1922). Current definitions are similar, describing stereotypes as qualities associated with particular groups of people. Katz and Braly (1933) conducted some of the classic work on stereotypes by asking Princeton University undergraduates to select from a list of traits those that seem "most typical of" several groups. The responses were telling in both their content and the degree of consensus. The most frequent traits selected for Blacks (referred to as Negroes in the study) were superstitious (by 84% of the participants) and lazy (75%). Americans were characterized as industrious (49%) and intelligent (48%). These were not the only groups included: Jewish people were most frequently described as shrewd (79%), Japanese as intelligent (48%), Italians as artistic (53%), Irish as pugnacious (45%), and Germans as scientifically minded (78%).

Several researchers, using the same materials, have repeated the study with new cohorts of Princeton students, over time. By the end of the 1960s, a decade in which the civil rights movement was prominent, the dominant stereotypical traits—at least as publicly expressed—had changed dramatically (Karlins, Coffman & Walters, 1969). For example, by 1967, the percentage of Princeton men who selected superstitious as a stereotype of Blacks declined from 84% to 13% and was replaced at the top of the list of traits by musical, which increased from 26% to 47%. Similarly, Jewish people were less frequently characterized as shrewd (79% to 30%) but more frequently described as ambitious (21% to 48%), Irish people were less frequently represented as pugnacious (45% to 13%) but more somewhat frequently described as quick-tempered (39% to 43%) and nationalistic (21% to 41%), and Japanese people were less frequently characterized by intelligence (45% to 20%) but more often by industriousness (43% to 57%). Germans continued to be stereotyped as scientifically minded and industrious, but those percentages dropped by 31% (78% to 47%), and 6% (65% to 59%), respectively. Moreover, the results using this adjective checklist methodology tend to reflect more what people believe are the stereotypes that other people hold rather than what they personally believe: Personal endorsement of social stereotypes tends to be weaker, particularly among people low in prejudice (Devine & Elliot, 1995).

Whereas early research generally conceived of stereotyping as a faulty thought process, more recent research has focused on the functional aspects of stereotypes in simplifying a complex environment. They are now considered to be cognitive schemas, often rooted in culturally held beliefs that are used by social perceivers to process information about others. Stereotypes not only reflect beliefs about the traits characterizing typical group members but also contain information about other qualities, such as expected social roles and characteristics of the group (e.g., within-group homogeneity). Although stereotypes can contain evaluative content and are often congruent with prejudice, they (a) need not be evaluative, (b) can include different types of content (e.g., conceptual associations with a target group), and (c) may rely on different neural pathways than does prejudice (Amodio & Lieberman, 2009).

Explicit and Implicit Measures of Prejudice and Stereotypes

The ways both attitudes and stereotypes are measured have also changed dramatically. Traditionally, prejudice and stereotyping have been measured in direct, explicit ways, using self-reports. One widely recognized problem with explicit measures is that they allow people to control their responses to appear in

socially desirable ways. Thus, it would be difficult to determine whether the negative stereotypes observed by Katz and Braly (1933) had actually faded or whether people have learned that it would be socially inappropriate to admit to such beliefs. With respect to the assessment of racial attitudes, for example, among the most commonly used measures of Whites' attitudes toward Blacks are currently Symbolic Racism Scale (Sears & Henry, 2005) and the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). Both measures are indirect assessments of attitudes in that they do not ask directly about negative qualities of Blacks but instead about responses to a number of political or social opinions in which a pattern of responses implicates underlying racial prejudice. For example, people who indicate greater opposition to programs (e.g., affirmative action) perceived to be especially beneficial for Blacks and who believe more strongly that discrimination is no longer a problem for Blacks would score higher in modern racism.

Moreover, in a highly influential article, Devine (1989) argued that explicit bias is not the whole story. In contrast, *implicit attitudes and stereotypes* are unconscious thoughts, feelings, and beliefs that are automatically activated when we are exposed to a member of a social group unlike ours and for which we have developed a bias. Implicit attitudes and stereotypes represent well-learned and habitual cultural associations of which people may not be fully aware. Whereas explicit attitudes and stereotypes are typically measured with self-reports, implicit attitudes and stereotypes are typically gauged with response latency procedures, memory tasks, physiological measures (e.g., heart rate and galvanic skin response), and indirect self-report measures (e.g., biases in behavioral and trait attributions).

The basic principle behind most of the response latency techniques is that a person will respond more quickly to ideas or concepts that are associated in the mind than to those that are not. For example, is each of the following strings of letters made up of two words: table-chair, doctor-nurse, chair-nurse? The answer is yes in all three cases, but it takes people a split-second longer to say yes to chair-nurse because those two words are not as strongly associated in your mind as doctor-nurse or table-chair. How about Blacks-good, Blacks-bad, Whites-good, Whites-bad? Notice that you are not asked directly about whether you believe that there is an association between the pairs of words.

The most commonly used method of this type is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). In the IAT, people have to make decisions, by pressing a response key on a computer keyboard, about different groups (such as Anglos and Latinos or Whites and Blacks) in conjunction with positive and negative words (<https://implicit.harvard.edu/>). Because these responses occur in a split second, they are very difficult to control.

Although the issue remains controversial and unresolved, many psychologists consider implicit and explicit attitudes and stereotypes to reflect different components of a system of dual attitudes. In this view, implicit responses are rooted in a slow-learning, associative system while explicit responses are tied to fast-learning systems in the brain. Implicit responses represent older attitudes and stereotypes that have been overwritten by newer, explicit attitudes, either completely or in part (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Whereas implicit responses often have a strong emotional component, cognition and deliberative thought play a strong role in explicit attitudes and stereotypes.

One of the provocative implications of the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes is that we live in societies that strongly endorse the principle of equality but, at the same time, have racist, sexist, and ethnically discriminatory traditions and well-established racial and ethnic disparities in wealth, health, and residence. Repeated exposure to these pervasive disparities and repeated media portrayals of members of various groups in stereotype-consistent ways produces systemic differences in implicit attitudes and stereotypes. Hundreds of thousands of people have taken the IAT, and a large body of research demonstrates systematic biases—of a magnitude much greater than what explicit, self-report measures reveal—against Latinos (mainly by Anglos), Blacks (mainly by non-Blacks), LGBT persons, overweight people, women, and people with disabilities. These biases, at least in US culture, are similar across levels of socio-economic status, educational achievement, and region of the country.

Although research using the IAT has produced a large body of empirical evidence indicating widespread implicit biases toward members of particular groups, scholars in this area debate the meaning of these differences. Some have criticized the IAT based on its psychometric properties or questioned the degree to which it actually measures automatically activated associations. Others have expressed concerns about whether IAT responses represent general cultural associations rather than a particular individual's implicit stereotypes or attitudes, as well as about how well the IAT predicts subsequent discriminatory behavior (Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). Despite, and perhaps in part because of, these controversial issues surrounding the IAT, work on implicit bias is one of the most active areas of research on prejudice and stereotyping and a topic that has attracted substantial interest in the media.

Discrimination

Whereas prejudice represents an attitude and stereotypes reflect beliefs, discrimination is a behavior. *Discrimination* refers to an act that creates, maintains, or reinforces an advantage for some groups and their members over other groups and their members (Dovidio et al., 2010). Discrimination is often represented in terms of the behavior of individuals directed toward members, but these acts are not necessarily consciously motivated. Moreover, individual bias expressed by individuals is not necessary for discrimination to be experienced by members of some groups. Instead, discrimination may be enacted broadly through institutional structures and policies or embedded in cultural beliefs and representations that value various groups differently. Thus, individual-, institutional-, and cultural-level processes may operate in concert to provide some groups systematic advantages and/or to impose disadvantages on other groups (Jones, 1997). These multilevel processes are related, such that biases at the individual level of analysis, whether regarding explicit or implicit processes, necessarily implicate higher-order institutional and cultural influences and biases. Often these influences are cloaked in justifications or ideologies that obscure the biases and thus allow the discriminatory nature of the treatment to go undetected and unaddressed.

Although prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination are distinct concepts, important to understand in their own right, much of the work in psychology has examined their common roots. In the next section, we consider the role that personality and individual differences play in creating and perpetuating intergroup bias.

Bases of Bias: Personality and Individual Differences

The study of how personality and other stable personal orientations relate to prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination has been highly influential in understanding intergroup biases. The historic trends on this topic also illustrate the shift in the field from characterizing bias as a form of psychopathology to understanding it as a consequence of the way people try to adapt to everyday situations.

The Authoritarian Personality (and Its Legacy)

Early work on personality and individual differences related to discrimination, inspired by Sigmund Freud's psychodynamic theory, viewed discrimination as stemming from displaced hostility and aggression. In this tradition, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) in their classic volume, *The Authoritarian Personality*, identified a unique pattern of family experiences that made people

susceptible to developing a personality profile that predisposed them to extreme bias. These individuals, “high authoritarians,” tended to submit to authority, adhere to conventional values, and think in rigid ways. People who scored higher on a measure of authoritarianism were more likely to exhibit prejudice toward, endorse negative stereotypes of, and discriminate against a broad range of marginalized groups.

The classic work on the authoritarian personality was subsequently critiqued heavily on both methodological and theoretical grounds, and the theory fell into disrepute. Yet, aspects of its legacy are currently evident. For example, there is evidence that individuals commonly harbor “generalized prejudice”: People who tend to discriminate against one group also tend to be biased against a wide range of other groups (Bergh, Akrami, Sidanius, & Sibley 2016). In addition, many of these measures—such as need for structure, need for closure, intolerance of ambiguity, and being low on a fundamental personality dimension of openness to new experiences—are characteristics resembling those associated with the authoritarian personality (Hodson & Dhont, 2015). People who have a greater need for structure are particularly prone to stereotyping, over and above their tendency to be prejudiced (Newheiser & Dovidio, 2012). In addition, people who are more religious (regardless of their religion) and more conservative tend to show greater prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

However, the assertion that political conservatives are necessarily more prone to exhibit biased attitudes toward other groups than political liberals has been challenged in recent studies. For instance, more politically conservative people display more negative attitudes toward Blacks and homosexuals, but they report that the basis of this attitude is they perceive these groups as politically liberal and as violating conservative moral values (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). By contrast, more politically liberal people exhibit more negative attitudes toward business people and Christian fundamentalists, again in large part, because they view these as groups in conflict with liberal values. Thus, both liberals and conservatives tend to be biased toward groups perceived to be on the opposite end of the political spectrum. These mirror-image biases play a substantial role in the “political divide.”

Two of the most prominent individual difference measures relating to the tendency to discriminate against members of different groups are the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale and the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

The RWA Scale (Altemeyer, 1996) was derived from the classic work on authoritarianism but is currently characterized as an ideological dimension that is related to social and cultural conservatism and conventionalism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). Individuals who score higher on RWA tend to endorse more strongly statements such as, “What our country needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path” and “The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, whereas the radicals and the protestors are usually just ‘loud mouths’ showing off their ignorance.” As indicated in meta-analysis, RWA robustly predicts bias toward a range of different social groups, including ethnic minorities, women, disabled people, and sexual minorities (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

Social Dominance Orientation

The SDO Scale measures an individual’s preference for systems of group-based dominance and for ideologies that support this hierarchy (Ho et al., 2015). The net result of these preferences is support for policies and practices that permit the oppression of low-status groups. For example, people higher in SDO tend to be more sexist, racist, and biased toward immigrants, lesbians, gay men, feminists, and physically disabled

people (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). The scale has been recently updated to highlight the two dimensions of this orientation: *SDO-Dominance*, which represents a preference for systems of group-based dominance (“An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom”) and *SDO-Anti-egalitarianism*, which represents a preference for social ideologies and policies that normalize inequalities (“We shouldn’t guarantee that every group has the same quality of life”). SDO-Dominance correlates more strongly with prejudice than SDO-Anti-egalitarianism.

Although both SDO and RWA are robust predictors of prejudice, they are only moderately correlated with each other. One reason for their relatively weak relationship is that they reflect different worldviews: People higher in SDO are more likely to see the world as a “competitive jungle” in which the tough-minded prevail, whereas those higher in RWA tend to see the world as a “dangerous place” that needs to be managed through strict order (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). SDO primarily reflects beliefs about how groups should relate to one another and perceptions of group hierarchies, whereas RWA reflects submission to those higher in authority, with an emphasis on conformity and punishing deviants. As a consequence, although both scales predict prejudice toward a range of groups, each has unique predictive utility: SDO is a stronger predictor of prejudice toward low-status groups and attitudes toward economic issues, whereas RWA more strongly predicts prejudice toward unconventional groups and attitudes toward social issues.

Bases of Bias: Social Psychological Factors

Whereas the personality and individual difference perspective focuses on the meaning of the ways we are different, social psychological approaches emphasize the influences that we experience in common that affect prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Many of these processes relate to basic principles that shape intergroup relations, as discussed in Chapter 11.

Social Categorization

Social categorization is a fundamental building block of social life that is based on the general tendency to classify people into groups (Kawakami, Amodio, & Hugenberg, 2017). Social categorization processes occur for the same reasons that guide social cognition processes: We are “cognitive misers”—an adaptive mechanism that enables us to simplify the world to understand and function when we are confronted by the vast amount of information that exceeds our capacity to process and comprehend at any one time. Thinking about people as individuals rather than in terms of their group membership requires much more cognitive effort and resources so, as a result, social categorization is the cognitive default (Fiske, 2012). We think about others based on their group membership and switch to more personalized processing only when we believe that there is a particular reason to do so (e.g., when motivated to form a relationship with them).

In general, viewing others in terms of their group membership makes us *feel* that we understand the world better. Once we categorize a person into a group (e.g., Italian, Latino, Red Sox fan), we see that person as similar to other members of the same group whom we know, ascribe the characteristics that we believe members of that group share to that person, and thus feel that we can understand and can predict that person’s behavior better. Seeing a person as a member of a social category allows top-down perceptions: We fill in gaps in the available information about the particular person with information about what people in that group are generally like. Groups do not have to be meaningful for people to think and feel positively about members of their own group and become wary of others.

The effects of social categorization are profound and highly replicable: Psychologists worldwide have documented what occurs when people perceive, think about or interact with others on the basis of whether they belong to their ingroup or an outgroup (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). People tend to:

- see members of the other group as very similar to each other (outgroup homogeneity);
- exaggerate differences between ingroup and outgroup members;
- feel closer to ingroup members;
- perceive outgroup members as less human;
- value the lives of ingroup members more than those of outgroup members;
- think more deeply and in a more detailed fashion about ingroup members;
- believe that ingroup members share their attitudes while outgroup members have contrasting attitudes;
- want to approach ingroup members but avoid outgroup members;
- anticipate outgroup members to be biased against them and value ingroup members more when they are biased against the outgroup; and
- be more helpful, cooperative and generous with ingroup members.

It is important to note, as Brewer discusses in Chapter 11, that two biasing processes occur: (a) favoritism toward the ingroup and (b) avoidance or hostility toward the outgroup.

Social Identity

Categorizing the social world into ingroups and outgroups also activates basic motivational processes that ultimately lead to prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. As initially explained by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017) and discussed in some detail by Brewer in Chapter 11 on intergroup relations, people are motivated to be perceived favorably by themselves and others. This desire for positive self-regard may be satisfied by their own accomplishments (associated with their personal identity), as well as by membership in prestigious social groups (reflecting their social identity). This need for positive distinctiveness motivates social comparisons that favorably differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup and, consequently, the self from others. Think for a minute about students at another university. Almost immediately, ideas about how your school or program is different and better than the other school will pop into your mind!

This basic and spontaneous motivation has important consequences for how we treat members of other groups and how we connect to members of our own group (see Chapter 11). In general, people who are more highly identified with a group work harder for the group, adhere more strongly to group norms and values, and are more affected by the successes or failure of the group. Becoming identified with a social group also helps to alleviate an uncertainty about who we are and anxiety about our self-worth, but this process can also have it dire consequences. It can lead people to be attracted to extremist groups. These groups are tightly organized, with clear and rigid rules, homogeneous memberships, a strong sense of mission, and strong and often charismatic leadership—all characteristics that can reduce uncertainty and make people feel secure (Hogg, 2012).

The more strongly we identify with a group, the more likely we are to see ourselves as a typical member of the group. As explained by *self-categorization theory* (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see also Hogg et al., 2017)—a derivative of social identity theory—this typically includes ways of thinking and behaving that are specific to and characteristic of the group. We think, feel, and act like members of that group *should*. We are not simply conforming to what people around us do; we actually take on the

character of what we imagine the typical member of group (the “prototype”) is like. We also tend to see others in ways prototypic of their group membership, and, as a consequence, when our social identity is activated, stereotypes of their group become a potent guide to behavior toward members of that group.

Strong social identity can come entirely at the expense of personal identity—people can “lose” themselves in the group or become “fused” with a group. *Identity fusion* (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015) describes an extreme, visceral sense of oneness with an ingroup in which the self and the group are indistinguishable. Identity fusion occurs when individuals fully incorporate their group’s values into their understanding of who they are, leading to fusion of aspects of the personal and social self. The profound feeling of connection with fellow ingroup members that can give rise to identity fusion often results from sharing intense bonding experiences and can produce extreme group-serving behaviors, such as people sacrificing their lives for the ingroup. “Being part of a collectivist cause,” Arie Kruglanski, co-director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, observed, “has always been a hallmark of people willing to undergo personal sacrifices” (DeAngelis, 2009, p. 60).

Functional Relations between Groups

Social categorization and social identity not only create a foundation for the development and operation of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination but also predispose people to be competitive and to see other groups as aggressive competitors. When people interact as representatives of different groups, rather than as individuals, they behave in a greedier and less trustworthy manner (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Actual competition, in turn, often readily stimulates overt and sometimes extreme forms of bias against members of outgroups.

A classic field study by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) vividly illustrates this effect. In a series of studies known as the Robber’s Cave studies (Robber’s Cave is a state park in Oklahoma), Sherif and his colleagues randomly assigned twenty-two 12-year-old boys attending summer camp to two groups (who subsequently named themselves Eagles and Rattlers). When the groups engaged in a series of competitive activities (a tug-of-war and baseball and touch football games), intergroup bias and conflict quickly developed. Group members regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., “sissies,” “stinkers,” “pigs,” “bums,” “cheaters”), and each group conducted raids on the other’s cabins that resulted in the destruction and theft of property. Later, Sherif and his colleagues arranged intergroup contact under neutral, non-competitive conditions. These interventions did not calm the ferocity of the exchanges, however. Only by altering the functional relations between the groups by introducing a series of superordinate goals—ones that could not be achieved without the full cooperation of both groups—such as pulling a stalled truck back to camp—were the experimenters able to reduce prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination between the groups.

The Robbers Cave research showed how easy it is to arouse prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination between groups. Moreover, as Brewer (see Chapter 11) discusses, the conflict that produces these biases may not only be about material resources (realistic threat) but also about how another group threatens core ideas and beliefs (symbolic threat; see Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2016). Greater endorsement of the statement “Blacks have too many positions of power and responsibility in this country” indicates greater realistic threat among Whites, whereas greater agreement with the statement “Whites and Blacks have differing conceptions of what American culture should be” reflects greater symbolic racial threat.

Although you might think that physical threats would produce greater bias and ignite conflict more readily than symbolic threat, each type of threat contributes to bias, and both predict bias to about the same degree (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Moreover, conflict over symbolic issues may be more likely to escalate and more difficult to resolve than conflict over material possessions. It might be possible, for

example, to reach a political compromise between Israeli Jews and Palestinians over statehood and physical boundaries. However, there is no compromise when the discussions about territories involve “holy lands.” When two opposing principles are involved, people typically stand on one side or the other; there is little compromise in principles.

To summarize to this point, a substantial body of psychological evidence has identified a number of common factors that facilitate and support the development of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination and has illuminated how these phenomena operate individually and in concert to perpetuate inequality. However, somewhat surprisingly, given this empirical evidence and the general belief that both prejudice and stereotyping are precursors to discrimination, the actual interrelationships among prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination are significant but not especially strong. We explore this issue in the next section.

Empirical Relationships among Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination

One main reason we study prejudice and stereotyping is the belief that they predict behavior that has important consequences for others, our group, and our society. Fortunately, this assumption has been empirically substantiated, but the picture is not a simple one. In this section, we discuss how prejudice and stereotyping predict discrimination.

Prejudice and Discrimination

Using different measures of prejudice and assessing various types of behavior, research results converge on the conclusion that prejudice does systematically predict behavior. However, the magnitude of that effect (a meta-analytic r between 0.26 and 0.36; Greenwald et al., 2009; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008) is lower than the general attitude-behavior relationship observed in other domains. Moreover, the relationship between explicit prejudice and discrimination was weaker in various important intergroup domains, including Whites’ attitudes and behavior toward Blacks ($r = 0.12$), and attitudes and behavior in the domain of gender/sexual orientation ($r = 0.22$; Greenwald et al., 2009; cf. Oswald et al., 2013).

One possible reason why the relationship between explicit prejudice and discrimination tends to be weaker than the general attitude-behavior relationship is that, as we mentioned earlier, expressions of intergroup attitudes are susceptible to pressures to appear in a socially desirable way. Thus, one might expect that implicit measures of prejudice, which are less susceptible to social desirability effects, would be a better predictor of discrimination than explicit attitudes. The evidence in support of this conjecture is suggestive but controversial (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). In their meta-analysis, Greenwald et al. (2009) found—for example, with respect to orientations of Whites toward Blacks—that the relationship implicit attitudes, measured using the IAT, and behavior was twice as strong as the explicit attitude-behavior relationship reported in the same meta-analysis. However, Oswald et al. (2013), using the same studies but applying different criteria in their analysis, concluded that the effects of implicit bias on discrimination were much weaker than those presented by Greenwald et al. Although evidence that responses on the IAT reliably predict discriminatory behavior continues to accumulate, the strength of the relationships are generally modest. Perhaps because of this, reducing implicit bias does

not necessarily lead to reductions in discriminatory behavior (for a meta-analytic review, see Forscher et al., 2017).

Stereotypes and Behavior

The relationship between the degree to which individuals hold stereotypes of a group and discrimination against that group is, overall, similarly modest, although that relationship holds more strongly when the behavior (e.g., hiring someone for a specific job) relates more directly to the central aspects of the group stereotype (e.g., leadership ability or intelligence).

However, work by Fiske and her colleagues on the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; see also Fiske, 2012) has shown how a fuller understanding of the principles underlying stereotyping can lead to more accurate and sophisticated understanding of its behavioral consequences. According to the stereotype content model, a stereotype is a function of how a group is perceived on two dimensions: warmth and competence. When we have to think or interact with a group from which we are different, we process what we know about their competence or ability to perform and how we feel about them. Although groups do indeed have unique characteristics related to history and to the specific intergroup context (e.g., the history of slavery and discrimination against persons described often as “Black” in the United States), there appear to be systematic principles that shape the content of stereotypes in all cultures.

Groups high in warmth and high in competence (e.g., the ingroup, close allies) elicit pride and admiration; groups high in warmth but low in competence (e.g., housewives, the elderly) produce pity and sympathy; those low in warmth but high in competence (e.g., Asians, Jews) elicit envy and jealousy; and groups low on both warmth and competence (e.g., welfare recipients, poor people) are associated with feelings of disgust, anger, and resentment. These emotional responses, in turn, shape how a person responds to a group: Admiration promotes active facilitation or support for the group, contempt relates to active harm, envy predicts passive support, and pity leads to passive harm. The stereotype content model encompasses the way people classify, characterize, and respond to a broad range of social groups across different countries and time periods.

Taken together, there is evidence that both prejudice (measured either explicitly or implicitly) and stereotyping do predict discriminatory behavior. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in these relationships, with effects varying across different forms of intergroup behavior and ranging from strongly positive to weak or even negligible effects. Rather than viewing the modest magnitude and variability of the results in this area as a failure of science, they represent opportunities to appreciate the complexities of bias in a contemporary world. In the remainder of this section, we discuss some insights that can help illuminate the ways prejudice and stereotyping influence discrimination.

Correspondence between Predictors and Outcomes

One key factor affecting the relative predictive strength of implicit and explicit measures is the type of behavior being examined and the context in which the behavior occurs. For example, whereas implicit measures may better predict spontaneous behaviors, explicit measures may better predict deliberative behaviors, including those in situations in which social desirability factors are salient (Fazio & Olson, 2014). Consistent with this argument, explicit anti-immigrant prejudice has recently been shown to predict deliberate action against immigrants among White British and Italian participants (Shepherd, Fasoli, Pereira, & Branscombe, 2018). By contrast, implicit intergroup attitudes are better predictors of nonverbal behavior

in intergroup interactions (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). These effects of implicit bias also help to explain why doctors with more negative implicit racial attitudes are perceived by Black patients as less friendly and less patient-centered in their interactions (Penner, Phelan, Earnshaw, Albrecht, & Dovidio, 2018).

Prediction at an Aggregated Level

Social psychology has typically examined intergroup relations through the lens of individuals and their intrapsychic processes, including prejudice and stereotypes. As the previous sections reveal, when measured at the individual level, the relationship between explicit and implicit prejudice and discrimination is systematic and statistically significant but generally only modest in magnitude. However, the cumulative effects of individuals' prejudices can considerably limit opportunities for members of traditionally disadvantaged groups, and even small individual biases, when aggregated, can produce substantial social inequities over time (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015).

In contrast to social psychology's traditional focus on individual-level processes, contextual factors, such as geography and social setting, are critical when examining the effects of prejudice and stereotyping in the aggregate. In the United States, for example, there are systematic differences in racial prejudice by geographic area, and these regional differences in prejudice (i.e., individual prejudice aggregated by region) profoundly shape the social environment and, subsequently, the experiences and well-being of minority groups. In a recent study, for instance, Leitner, Hehman, Ayduk, and Mendoza-Denton (2016) integrated explicit and implicit measures of White Americans' prejudice ($N > 1$ million) with health-related measures from the US Centers for Disease Control, including access to healthcare and circulatory disease risk. In counties in which Whites expressed less favorable explicit attitudes toward Blacks, Blacks had lower access to affordable healthcare and greater mortality from circulatory disease, compared to Whites. These findings demonstrate that aggregated by geographical location or social setting, both explicit and implicit prejudice can be associated with a number of highly consequential outcomes, at times literally involving matters of life and death (Payne, Vuletic, & Lundberg, 2017).

Subtle Discrimination

Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination are pervasive yet, as forms of unfair bias, they seem to stand in contrast to prevailing principles of justice and norms of fairness. These principles and norms not only limit the extent to which individuals discriminate against others but also shape the way bias is justified and expressed when it does occur, producing subtle patterns of bias.

System-Justifying Ideology

Cross-cultural evidence suggests that societies in which groups are hierarchically organized function efficiently, but hierarchies differ with regard to power and control. As a result, these power disparities provide advantages and privileges enjoyed by members of some groups and promote the disadvantages experienced by members of other groups. Social dominance theory (Sidanius, Cotterill, Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Cavarch, 2017) proposes that the development of group-based hierarchies is motivated by ideologies that

reinforce social and structural inequality and views racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination as special cases of a general tendency for people to form, maintain, and enhance group-based hierarchies. Social dominance theory highlights that prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination are key mechanisms that members of high-status groups use to create and sustain group hierarchy.

System Justification

System justification theory (Jost, Gaucher, & Stern, 2015) further emphasizes processes that maintain and exacerbate inequality between groups. According to the theory, people are not simply motivated to promote the interests of their immediate group but are also motivated to defend, justify, and bolster existing social, economic, and political systems, institutions, and arrangements. This framework focuses on the social and psychological process by which people—as individuals and as members of groups—legitimize the institutions and arrangements in society, thereby coming to see social inequality (and associated discriminatory practices) as not only legitimate but also natural and necessary.

If, as system justification theory suggests, people try to see the social system as fair and just, then they should see the way society *is* as the way it *should be*. This effect should be particularly strong for people who feel dependent on the current system. In one study (Kay et al., 2009), for instance, experimenters tried to increase female Canadian students' feelings of dependency by having them read a newspaper article, supposedly from the *Toronto Star*, indicating that the government's actions and the quality of services it provides has a profound influence on Canadian citizen's lives. Students in a low-dependency condition read a similar article, but it emphasized that the policies of the government had negligible effects on what people do on a daily basis. Participants next read a brief description of the responsibilities of Canadian members of Parliament, accompanied by a graph showing that currently only 20% of the members of Parliament were women. Consistent with system justification theory, women who were led to believe that they were highly dependent on the government were more likely to defend the status quo. These women were less likely to endorse statements that there should be more women in politics and in Parliament than those who believed that they were low in dependency. From their perspective, having only 20% female members of Parliament was just fine. System justification theory thus accounts for the fact that low-status group members often support the status quo, often at a cost to themselves and fellow group members.

Benevolent Bias

The tension between the psychological forces that promote prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination and the desire to appear in socially desirable ways, or to genuinely desire to be fair and unbiased, have also created other subtle forms of bias in the way individuals behave toward others. Whereas overtly negative actions by an individual toward a member of another group may readily be recognized as unfair discrimination, unmerited positive behavior toward one's own group (e.g., nepotism) is less generally recognized as discrimination but still puts members of other groups at a disadvantage (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; see also Chapter 11).

In her classic book, *The Velvet Glove*, Jackman (1994) describes how paternalism represents another subtle form of discrimination perpetuated by ostensibly positive actions. Glick and Fiske (2001) further show that benevolent sexism, the seemingly positive view that women are "pure creators who ought to be protected, supported, and adored" (p. 109), carries with it the idea that women are weak. This system-justifying view legitimates the status inequality between men and women and promotes acceptance of inequality. Research guided by Nadler's (2002) intergroup helping as status relations model illuminates

how subtle bias also operates through prosocial behavior. When intergroup relations are perceived as insecure, members of high-status groups are more likely to offer dependency-oriented help (e.g., offering a full solution to a problem, which reinforces the group's superior status) than autonomy-oriented help (e.g., showing how a solution can be reached, which promotes independence in the future) to members of low-status groups.

Personal Justification and Rationalization

Subtle discrimination can also involve negative behaviors toward members of another group, as noted by Crandall and Eshleman (2003), but mainly when the act can be justified in some way. According to the aversive racism framework (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Pearson, 2017), this process of rationalization of discrimination occurs even among people who consciously endorse egalitarian principles but who may unconsciously (implicitly) harbor negative attitudes. These individuals—aversive racists—generally do not discriminate when appropriate behavior is clearly defined, but they do systematically discriminate when such norms are unclear or they can justify their behavior on the basis of some element of the situation (e.g., a candidate's lack of "fit" for a job) that is ostensibly unrelated to group membership. Like other forms of subtle bias, the unfair nature of this act may not be easily recognizable as discrimination, but, like blatant bias, these acts systematically disadvantage members of certain groups.

Institutional and Cultural Bias

Recent work in psychology that draws on more macro-level perspectives in sociology and public health illuminates the role of structural stigma (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2014). This perspective recognizes that historical, economic, ideological, and institutional factors can perpetuate racial inequality in the absence of personal intentions to discriminate. Rather than focusing on the role of individual prejudice or stereotypes, it views intergroup bias (e.g., in the form of racism, sexism, heterosexism) as embedded in social structures, which leads members of socially disadvantaged groups to view inequality as normative and legitimate (Jones, 1997). The perspective presents a provocative analysis of inequality and illuminates how and why both members of dominant and dominated groups may be unaware of the unfair influences that affect their lives. Structural stigma, which includes both institutional and cultural discrimination (Jones, Dovidio, & Vietze, 2014), relies on processes beyond individual and interpersonal acts such as "societal-level conditions, cultural norms, and institutional policies that constrain the opportunities, resources, and wellbeing of the stigmatized" (Hatzenbueher & Link, 2014, p. 2). Institutional biases, unlike individual bias, magnify the adverse effects over thousands of instances and many decades (Jones, 1997). The cumulative effect is systemic bias that transcends individual prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

Institutional Discrimination

Institutional discrimination refers to institutional policies (e.g., voting laws, immigration policies) that may unfairly restrict the opportunities of particular groups of people. Although institutional racism can develop originally from intentional biases, it does not require individuals' intention to discriminate, the active support of individuals, or even the awareness of discrimination to operate. Institutional racism

becomes "ritualized" in ways that minimize the effort and energy individuals and groups need to expend to support it. Because institutional discrimination is not necessarily intentional or dependent on the overt efforts of individuals, it often must be inferred from disparate outcomes between groups traced back to differential policies (e.g., particular forms of identification required to vote).

Cultural Discrimination

Whereas institutional discrimination is associated with formal laws and policies, cultural discrimination is deeply embedded in the fiber of a culture's history, standards, and normative ways of behaving. Cultural discrimination represents beliefs about the superiority of a dominant group's cultural heritage over those of other groups and the expression of such beliefs in individual actions or institutional policies. It occurs when one group exerts the power to define values for a society. Cultural discrimination involves not only privileging the culture, heritage, and values of the dominant group but also imposing this culture on other groups. As a consequence, everyday activities implicitly communicate group-based bias, passing it to new generations. Culturally transmitted values, beliefs, goals, and standards are primary influences on the structure and function of institutions. Thus, cultural, institutional, and individual biases are intimately intertwined (Jones, 1997). These interconnections create the conditions that give rise to the implicit biases we discussed earlier.

Impact of Bias on Targets of Bias

Being the target of discrimination not only has significant material consequences, such as the restriction of employment opportunities, but also profound psychological and social consequences. Historically, Goffman's (1963) book, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity*, represents seminal work on this topic. Although identifying strongly with one's group may buffer, to some extent, the worst effects of being stigmatized, being victimized by prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination still has substantial adverse effects, including poorer mental and physical health (Richman, Pascoe, & Lattenner, 2018; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia 2014). Individuals higher in an individual difference measure of rejection sensitivity—the tendency to anxiously expect being rejected because of their group membership—are particularly susceptible to these adverse effects (Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Mendes, 2014).

Anticipated and Internalized Stigma

People who are frequently the targets of discrimination often chronically anticipate bias and, with repeated experiences with discrimination, may internalize stigma. Both have negative psychological consequences. Anticipating discrimination heightens vigilance toward others who are perceived as potential sources of unfair actions and enhances sensitivity to subtle forms of discrimination (Carter & Murphy, 2015). These reactions, however, also increase stress. Both anticipated and internalized stigma can thus create psychological barriers to behaviors, such as applying for a job, that ultimately disadvantage the person.

In part, because of perceptions of discrimination toward their group, people may experience stereotype threat—concerns about being judged or treated negatively because of negative cultural views of their group—in situations in which their social identity is salient. As first demonstrated in classic work by Steele and Aronson (1995; see also Schmader, Johns, & Forbes 2008), experiencing stereotype threat negatively

influences performance on tasks that people believe are relevant and important, and when it is experienced regularly, it leads to decreased identification with the related domain.

Although current research on this topic has identified factors that affect the influence the degree to which stereotype threat has detrimental effects (e.g., assessing performance with cognitive tasks and placing the test closer in time to the manipulation), there is general meta-analytic evidence that this phenomena has systematic negative effects for a range of groups. For example, in addition to the well-documented impact on racial and ethnic minority group members, experiencing stereotype threat leads to poorer performance by older individuals (Lamont, Swift, & Abrams, 2015), by girls (younger than 18; see Flore & Wicherts, 2015) as well as women in areas of science and technology, and among White participants playing golf when performance was described as reflecting “natural athletic ability” (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999).

Individual and Collective Action

People also often actively resist being discriminated against. However, individuals typically overestimate the degree to which they will directly confront discrimination. For example, in one study (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), women were presented with an imaginary scenario in which they were being asked questions by a male interviewer for a position as a research assistant. A number of these questions qualify as sexual harassment in an interview context. The interviewer asked: “Do you have a boyfriend?” “Do people find you desirable?” “Do you think it is important for women to wear bras to work?” The majority of participants said they would confront the man; 62% reported that they would tell him that the questions were inappropriate or at least ask him why he posed the question, and over one fourth (28%) of the women said that they would take stronger action by either rudely confronting the man or walking out of the interview. But how did women who directly encountered a situation like this actually respond? The majority (52%) ignored the harassment and responded directly to the question! A sizable portion (36%) did express their concerns about being asked the questions but mainly by politely asking the interviewer why he posed that question and mostly only after the interview was completed.

This and many other studies in which people experience discrimination consistently show that, because such encounters with discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, or other dimensions are unexpected and arouse complex emotional responses, targets of discrimination often respond much less forcefully than they anticipate they would. However, when they recognize such actions as a threat to their group, not just a personal affront, they are not only more likely to respond to the discrimination but to do so in coordination with other members of their group—that is, engage in *collective* action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Reducing Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination and Their Adverse Effects

A vast body of intergroup research has theorized and tested interventions aimed at improving intergroup relations through changing intergroup attitudes (Paluck & Green, 2009). Many of the approaches Brewer (see Chapter 11) discusses are designed to improve intergroup relations by reducing prejudice and

stereotyping. In this section, we highlight examples of four general approaches: (a) intergroup contact, (b) recategorization, (c) intervention to reduce the adverse impact of implicit prejudice and stereotyping, and (d) interventions aimed at inhibiting discrimination directly. These are not competitive positions; these various interventions can be combined to have greater impact on reducing discrimination than any one approach alone (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012).

Intergroup Contact

Intergroup contact has enormous potential for reducing prejudice and intergroup bias generally. There is robust evidence that more frequent and more positive intergroup contact produces lower levels of prejudice, (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2011; Tausch & Hewstone, 2010). Frequent positive intergroup contact can also lead to lower levels of implicit prejudice and stereotyping over time. The impact of this work on intergroup contact is substantial, practically as well as theoretically: This work has guided legal interventions, such as school, residential, and employment integration laws and policies.

Nevertheless, classic views of contact have some limitations. One limitation is that the original version of the hypothesis stated that personal, first-hand contact is required. This implies that we can only improve intergroup relations one or two people at a time. However, some of the most exciting new extensions of contact theory involve *indirect* forms of contact. For instance, bias can be reduced by mentally simulating having positive contact with a member of another group (imagined contact), by witnessing another member of your group interacting successfully with a member of another group or by interacting in favorable ways with members of other groups over the Internet (Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, & Hewstone, 2017). These indirect forms of contact are particularly pertinent because of new developments in communication technology that allow us to interact instantaneously and regularly with others across group lines.

Recategorization

Recategorization is an alternative bias-reduction strategy, one also discussed by Brewer (see Chapter 11) with respect to improving intergroup relations, rooted in research on how people socially categorize others as ingroup or outgroup members. Imagine you are walking down a busy street. As people approach you, you automatically notice their race, and you think about them in terms of their racial group membership. However, as a person from another race approaches you, you notice that he is wearing a sweatshirt from your college. Will you feel differently about him now? According to one theory of recategorization, you will.

This is the key idea of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2016)—that it is possible to change the ways we think about others by changing the way we think about their group membership. Emphasizing a common group membership can change the way we typically think of others from an “us” versus “them” to a more inclusive, superordinate “we” connection. This approach builds upon the principles of social categorization and social identity theory discussed earlier in this chapter. Once you categorize me as an ingroup member (a “we”) rather than an outgroup member (a “they”), I will benefit from all of the pro-ingroup biases that will make you like me more, discount my flaws, and want to work with me to promote “our” group.

These more positive reactions occur spontaneously and without much thought. Consider a variation of the example that began this section. Suppose you are a White college student walking around the football stadium before a game against a rival team. A White or Black person approaches you and asks for your help by answering a few questions about your food preferences for a survey he or she is doing. Would you

help? And would it matter whether the person had on the colors and insignia of your school or the other school? Nier Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, and Ward (2001) actually conducted this study and found that White participants did not help a White confederate more when he or she was wearing the home team's signature clothing than when he or she was wearing the other team's insignia; they were already part of the same (racial) ingroup. However, when White participants were asked for help by Black confederates, they were almost twice as likely to help (59% vs. 36% of the time) when the confederates wore the same team (university ingroup) insignia than when they wore the rival team's signature clothing. The home-team clothing represented a common ingroup identity between White and Black students at the game. But what if the person in need was physically injured and in real trouble? Are you the type of person whose decision about whether to help would be determined by something so superficial as whether he or she was wearing a soccer shirt of your team or an opposing team? The research shows that, no matter what you think now, the answer is probably "yes" (Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005).

Reducing the Influence Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping

Whereas intergroup contact and recategorization are broad strategies that can reduce prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination and improve intergroup relations through multiple mechanisms, other approaches are more focused in their objectives. One of the main problems with implicit forms of prejudice and stereotyping is that many people—including those who genuinely believe that they are unbiased—are unaware that they possess these negative orientations. In addition, because we are typically motivated to see ourselves as good and fair people, we have well-practiced mechanisms for denying or explaining away discrimination. Thus, one key step in helping people behave in a more unbiased fashion is to make them aware of implicit bias.

One way to begin this process is by having people discover that they might be unintentionally biased. When people who score low on prejudice acknowledge discrepancies between their behavior toward minorities (what they *would* do) and their personal standards (what they *should* do), they feel guilt and compunction (Burns, Monteith, & Parker, 2017). Guilt and compunction are unpleasant psychological states that motivate people to respond without prejudice in the future. With practice, these individuals learn to reduce biased responses, including implicit prejudice and stereotypes, and respond in ways that are consistent with their nonprejudiced personal standards.

A related strategy is to promote the development of positive thoughts that are unconsciously activated more strongly than are prejudice or negative stereotypes. For example, some people have been socialized to hold *chronic egalitarian goals*—habitual ways of thinking that, when activated, inhibit even implicit biases that are normally automatically activated. For these people, seeing a Black person more strongly activates egalitarian thoughts than bias. They are faster to respond to egalitarian-relevant words (e.g., "equality") when primed with Black faces compared to White faces (Moskowitz & Igarri, 2009). And, how can we acquire chronic egalitarian goals? The answer is simple to state but difficult to accomplish: Practice, practice, practice. For example, extended practice in responding "no" to stereotypic group members and saying "yes" to affirm culturally nonstereotypic positive qualities (e.g., "intelligent" with minorities) inhibits the activation of spontaneous racial stereotypes (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). Practice makes perfect.

Reducing Discriminatory Behavior Directly

Other strategies focus directly on controlling discriminatory behavior, rather than on inhibiting the attitudes or stereotypes, either implicit or explicit, that underlie that behavior. One promising intervention

relies on *implementation intentions*, a method derived from research on goal pursuit whereby explicitly formulating if-then plans—if this happens, what I will do is . . .—to create reflexive response patterns (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011). In the domain of intergroup bias, when people deliberately prepare and establish a nondiscriminatory response for an anticipated intergroup encounter, prejudice and stereotyping cues are less likely to translate into discriminatory behavior and more likely to promote interest in engaging in activities—such as intergroup contact—that can reduce prejudice in the longer term (Stern & West, 2014).

Besides personal efforts to control discriminatory responses, other, social forces may be invoked. The influence of norms on behavior has been studied extensively in social psychology, and intergroup norms have been identified as significant drivers of prejudice and discrimination (Crandall & Stangor, 2005). As such, targeting perceptions of social norms may provide a more efficient way to promote positive relations between groups than targeting individual attitudes, which may be deeply anchored in personal experiences and long-term socialization. Indeed, perceptions of social norms can shift relatively rapidly in response to significant new information, such as the US Supreme Court ruling in favor of same-sex marriage (Tankard & Paluck, 2017).

New norms can also be communicated through mass media. For instance, one intervention to promote reconciliation after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was a radio soap opera (Paluck, 2009). The soap opera portrayed the rise of tensions between Tutsis and Hutus over a land shortage and—in a situation resembling the events leading up to the 1994 genocide—the more prosperous community is attacked. However, unlike what actually happened earlier, a number of characters in the soap opera banded together across group lines to support one another and spoke out against those who advocated violence. The objective was to depict how the people of Rwanda currently *should* behave under these circumstances. Although personal attitudes about the other group did not change, listeners' perceptions of social norms and anticipated behaviors toward members of the other group changed (compared a control condition) with respect to intermarriage, trust, empathy, and cooperation. This normative approach thus holds considerable promise for improving intergroup relations even in the absence of changes in personal attitudes or stereotypes.

Conclusion

Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination are rooted in many of the same basic psychological processes, individual differences in personality and ideology, intergroup relations, and structural factors in society. However, they are also distinct aspects of intergroup bias conceptually and empirically. Because of the multiple forces that shape prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination and their functional natures, these biases are difficult to change. However, both explicit and implicit prejudice may be reduced through intergroup contact and recategorization, as well as interventions developed specifically to reduce implicit prejudice toward outgroups and to reduce the extent to which intergroup bias translates into discrimination. The study of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination remains an active field of research, with important theoretical and practical implications.

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